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Theranos was a Silicon Valley start-up founded by Elizabeth Holmes in 2003. Holmes claimed to 
have developed a new blood-testing device that had the potential to revolutionize the healthcare 
industry. She established partnerships with Walgreens and Safeway to make her technology 
available nationwide. She also secured a prestigious board of directors and an equally impressive 
investor base that raised over $700 million at a peak valuation of $9 billion. However, an 
investigation by The Wall Street Journal revealed the company had misled investors and 
endangered patients’ lives. In 2018, Theranos collapsed after years of battling lawsuits and federal 
charges. 
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Theranos: Betting on Blood 
“One of the most epic failures in corporate governance in the annals of American capitalism”. 
- John Carreyrou1 
On June 28, 2019, a crowd of journalists awaited Elizabeth Holmes at the door of the San Jose 
Federal Court in California for a pre-trial hearing2. She was accused of engaging in a multi-million-
dollar scheme to defraud investors, doctors, and patients alongside her former partner, Ramesh 
“Sunny” Balwani. If convicted, the duo could face up to 20 years behind bars3.  
Just five years prior, Holmes was the media darling of Silicon Valley and featured on the cover of 
Forbes, Fortune, and Inc. Magazine4. She was the founder of Theranos, a fast-growing biotech 
start-up that promised to revolutionize healthcare by making blood tests efficient, painless, and 
affordable. Holmes claimed to have developed a new portable device that could perform a full 
range of laboratory tests using only a few drops of blood from the finger at a fraction of 
competitors’ cost5. It was a highly disruptive invention that empowered patients with easy access 
to their health data and shifted the paradigm of modern medicine towards preventive care. The 
technology had the potential to be lifesaving6. 
As a result, Holmes was hailed as a visionary7. She established partnerships with Walgreens and 
Safeway to deploy the technology nationwide. To fast-track the company’s success, Holmes 
carefully built a prestigious board of directors that included former Secretaries of State and other 
government heavyweights. Money began pouring in and by 2015 Theranos had raised over $700 
million reaching a $9 billion valuation at its peak8. However, it all came crashing down when The 
Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reporter John Carreyrou published a series of articles questioning 
Theranos’ technology and practices9. The news story prompted investigations by regulatory 
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agencies, including the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) which revealed systematic failures in lab testing that put patients’ lives 
at risk10. In 2018, Theranos collapsed under the weight of numerous lawsuits and federal charges11. 
Dropping Out 
Holmes grew up listening to stories of greatness. She was a descendant of the Fleischmanns, one 
of the wealthiest families in late 19th century America and her great-great-grandfather was a 
decorated WWI veteran and surgeon who established the Cincinnati General Hospital12. Her 
parents had worked for government agencies in Washington, D.C., and had plenty of political 
connections. Therefore, from a young age, Holmes was driven to succeed. She dreamt not only of 
becoming a billionaire but also of making a difference in the world13. 
In 2002, Holmes began studying chemical engineering at Stanford University, where she was 
named President’s Scholar and received a $3,000 grant to pursue a research project14. In her 
freshman year, she met the Senior Associate Dean of Stanford’s School of Engineering, Channing 
Robertson, who was one of the leading experts on drug delivery-devices. Intrigued by Robertson’s 
research, Holmes persuaded him to let her work in his lab alongside PhD students15. The following 
summer, she used her fluency in Mandarin to secure an internship at the Genome Institute of 
Singapore, where she tested patients for SARS, a viral respiratory disease, using only basic 
methods such as syringes and nasal swabs16. Convinced that there were more efficient ways to 
perform blood tests, she developed and patented a solution called the “TheraPatch.” It was a 
wearable diagnostic device designed to administer medication and adjust dosages automatically by 
continuously sampling and testing patients’ blood17.  
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Holmes pitched her invention to Stanford Professor of Medicine Dr. Phyllis Gardner, who swiftly 
dismissed the idea arguing it was inherently flawed18. However, Robertson was starstruck by 
Holmes’ inventiveness stating “I realized that I could have just as well been looking into the eyes 
of a Steve Jobs or a Bill Gates”19. In 2003, eager to fulfill her vision, Holmes dropped out of college 
and used her tuition money to launch a company called Theranos (a mix of the words “therapy” 
and “diagnosis”). Robertson quickly joined the board as a technical advisor20. 
Seeking Capital 
Funding started to fall into place as Robertson introduced Holmes to venture capitalists21. In 
meetings with investors, she insisted on retaining control over the company and stressed that profits 
would be reinvested back into the business22. Holmes also leveraged family connections, including 
family-friend and former neighbor Tim Draper, to raise much of the initial capital. Draper was a 
successful venture capitalist and a partner at DFJ Ventures, a firm known for early investments in 
companies like Hotmail and Tesla. He invested $1 million while DFJ put in an additional $500,000. 
Real estate financier and long-time family friend Victor Palmieri also invested23. By early 2005, 
the company had raised $6 million following its Series A funding round (Exhibit 1)24. Despite the 
early fundraising success, Holmes failed to sway investors in the healthcare industry. MedVenture 
Associates and other life-science ventures turned down the opportunity as they questioned the 
viability of the product and grew apprehensive of Holmes’ inability to answer technical questions25. 
The Secret Idea 
As the TheraPatch proved itself too futuristic, Holmes shifted her vision towards a portable blood 
testing device that could be placed on patients’ homes. The first prototype was developed in 2005 
and named Theranos 1.0. To use it, patients would simply prick their fingers, collect a few drops 
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of blood into a cartridge, and insert it in a box, called a reader. The reader wirelessly connected to 
Theranos servers which analyzed the data and sent back the test results26. The new idea yielded $9 
million in Series B financing and brought an array of new investors, including the acclaimed 
venture capitalist Donald Lucas and the founder of Oracle, Larry Ellison (Exhibit 2). 
However, the level of miniaturization Holmes required the device to have posed significant 
challenges to her team of engineers. The biggest setback was the small samples of blood which had 
to be heavily diluted for the process to work, making tests results highly unreliable27. The 
compartmentalization of information was another constraint, as Holmes discouraged employees 
from sharing information. As a result, progress was slow, development costs were high, and the 
company was rapidly burning through cash with nothing but faulty technology to show for it28.  
In need of a solution, Holmes licensed the unfinished devices to pharmaceutical companies as a 
way of helping them evaluate patients’ reactions to drugs during clinical trials29. Arguing that the 
technology could reduce operating costs by up to 30% and guaranteeing “gold standard” accuracy, 
Holmes secured over five deals with companies such as Pfizer and GlaxoSmithKline30. When 
pitching to potential investors, Holmes estimated these deals would generate up to $300 million in 
revenues over the following 18 months. If she closed another 15 deals, the total revenue could grow 
to $1.5 billion (Exhibit 3)31. In late 2006, Theranos successfully raised another $30 million during 
its Series C round.  
Yet, Holmes had failed to disclose to investors that the deals were simple pilot studies contingent 
on product validation by the pharma companies32. Aware of Theranos 1.0’s shortcomings, Holmes 
asked her team to pre-record results on the device’s screen to be displayed at the end of each 
demonstration. As a result of this gimmick, the device seemed to work. The technique was effective 
in the first live demo to Novartis AG, a large Swiss pharmaceutical. When then Theranos’ CFO 
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Henry Mosley found out, he grew unease believing they were deceiving investors. Mosley was 
already suspicious when Holmes had asked him to approve highly ambitious revenue projections 
without granting him access to the corresponding business contracts. When he voiced his concerns, 
Holmes fired him immediately and did not replace him until 201733. This was not an isolated 
incident. It also happened to Ana Arriola who joined Theranos as Chief Design Architect. She was 
one of several designers Holmes poached from Apple to give Theranos’ devices the look and feel 
of the iPhone34. When Arriola discovered Theranos was doing a study on terminal cancer patients 
for Pfizer using defective devices, she thought the company was crossing ethical lines. Nonetheless, 
Holmes was dismissive and pushed ahead with the study. After just a few months with the 
company, Ana Arriola resigned35.  
At this stage, protecting the intellectual property of the company was paramount to its founder. 
Theranos was clouded in secrecy to the extent that it did not have a website nor had published any 
peer-reviewed literature validating its technology. Furthermore, Holmes closely controlled the flow 
of information through non-disclosure agreements, active email surveillance, and social media 
tracking36. This left most employees unaware of the extent of the device’s failures. Those who 
knew and raised concerns were either sidelined, fired, or met with legal threats37.  
The situation worsened when Sunny Balwani joined Theranos in 2009 as President and COO, after 
lending the company $12 million to keep it afloat since it was running out of cash38. Balwani was 
a software engineer who made a fortune during the dotcom bubble as a co-founder of an e-
commerce company. He met Holmes in Beijing in 2002 during a Stanford summer program. 
Despite the 20 years age difference, the pair eventually became romantically involved39. 
Nonetheless, the true nature of their relationship remained concealed from both the board, the 
investors and other employees40. Within the work environment, Balwani was known for being a 
7 
 
patronizing bully who antagonized employees through his aggressive and confrontational 
management style. His authoritarian approach earned him the nickname “The Enforcer” as he 
instilled a culture of fear inside the company. He put immense pressure on his teams, forcing people 
to work long hours and often made unreasonable demands41. As with Holmes, those who 
questioned him or failed to comply with his requests risked being fired. Consequently, Theranos 
became a revolving door of employees42.  
A New Way 
The plan of outsourcing the technology for clinical trials was collapsing. Deals with pharmaceutical 
companies would fall through as the flaws in Theranos devices could not be kept hidden during the 
comprehensive validation stages. After little progress with Theranos 1.0, Holmes developed a 
second sample processing unit in 2007 labeled the Edison. Inspired by a glue-dispensing robot, the 
Edison was a printer-size device containing a robotic arm that replicated the process followed by 
chemists in real labs. It diluted blood samples, added antibodies and reagents, and revealed a 
result43. In theory, the Edison could run over 200 tests accurately and in real-time with only a drop 
of blood44. Additionally, Theranos created the “nanotainer,” a proprietary glass vial designed as a 
non-invasive alternative to traditional phlebotomy techniques (Exhibit 4). This new technology 
finally allowed Elizabeth Holmes to focus on the consumer-centric business model she had initially 
envisioned. 
In the U.S., blood-testing had hardly evolved since the 1960s45. From a consumer perspective, 
blood draws continued to be inefficient as they require long needles, large blood samples and 
results could take up to weeks. Moreover, if patients were not covered by insurance, the process 
could be very costly46. Yet more than 10 billion lab tests were performed annually, of which 70% 
represented the basis for medical decisions47. It was a $75 billion market, dominated by LabCorp 
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and Quest, who together had over 40% of market share. These companies enjoyed large economies 
of scale and had successfully deterred new entrants for more than a decade (Exhibit 5 and 6)48.  
Thus, Holmes saw an opportunity to entirely redesign the industry business model. By combining 
the Edison and the “nanotainer,” blood tests became much simpler. The results would be available 
within minutes and could be sent directly to consumers. Additionally, by using its own laboratory 
machines rather than buying third party equipment and supplies, Theranos claimed it could reduce 
costs by up to 90%49. Holmes’ final goal was to have Edison devices “within five miles of every 
American home”50. She believed that by increasing the affordability and convenience of blood 
testing, patients would get tested more often. As a result, the regular monitoring of health data 
could enable early detection of diseases and potentially save people’s lives51.  
Partnering Up 
In early 2010, Theranos had the chance to enter the mass consumer market by partnering with 
Walgreens. For the country’s largest drugstore chain, a partnership meant more than just offsetting 
margin pressures by increasing revenues. It was an opportunity to differentiate itself from its 
competitors by empowering people to live healthier lives52. The mutual interest led the two 
companies to agree to a pilot program that would put Edison devices in 41 stores by mid-201153. 
If successful after a few years, the project would expand to more than 7,500 stores nationwide54.  
Before closing the deal, Walgreens hired healthcare consultant Kevin Hunter to vet the project. 
Already skeptical of Theranos’ claims, Hunter requested a simple comparison study to validate the 
technology. He also asked to see the company’s commercial lab, but Holmes refused. Hunter saw 
these issues as red flags and told Walgreens that Holmes may have been overstating the device’s 
capabilities. Walgreens executives dismissed the warning55. Not only were they taken by Holmes’ 
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utopian vision, they also feared the missed opportunity would be picked up by its rival, CVS. As a 
result, Walgreens CFO fast-tracked the project by lending Theranos $25 million and buying $50 
million worth of cartridges56. Over time, Walgreens would invest up to $140 million in Theranos, 
mostly in convertible debt instruments, despite not having access to its devices’ data nor to the 
company’s financial records57. 
Holmes also approached Safeway, a leading grocery chain in the United States. The company was 
struggling with weak results and had been using share buybacks to disguise the poor financial 
performance by artificially raising its earnings per share58. With solutions running out, Theranos 
emerged as a unique opportunity to drive growth and innovation. Excited with the possibility of 
having the Edison in his stores, Safeway’s CEO Steve Burd signed on as the exclusive supermarket 
provider of Theranos tests59. The deal stipulated that Safeway was to loan Theranos $30 million 
and build Wellness Centers in 800 of its stores60. These centers were designed to be upscale clinics 
where costumers could have their blood tested. In total, Safeway spent nearly $350 million in 
remodeling its stores over a two-year period61. 
In 2011, Holmes tried to secure a deal with the Department of Defense (DoD)62. She met the head 
of the U.S. Central Command, General Mattis at a military event where she briefly pitched her 
technology and its potential to save soldiers’ lives. Mattis was a feverish protector of his troops 
and promptly agreed to a live field test. However, when officials at the DoD’s medical department 
discovered that Holmes had tried to bypass FDA approval, they blocked the deal. But Mattis was 
unyielding in his demands and the officials settled for a limited research study to verify the device 
outside the battlefield. Two years later, Mattis retired and joined Theranos’ board of directors63.  
Solving the Unsolvable  
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One simple yet debilitating issue prevailed: the Edison still failed to perform accurately despite 
being slightly more reliable than Theranos 1.064. Holmes stated that the device could perform a 
wide range of blood tests when it could only do immunoassays, a class of tests that uses antibodies 
to measure the concentration of substances in the blood. While these are useful to test for Vitamin 
D or detect certain cancer markers, they cannot be used in routine tests such as measuring 
cholesterol or blood sugar levels65. The solution was to create the “miniLab,” an enhanced version 
of the Edison which could do additional classes of tests (Exhibit 7). This third-generation device 
contained a panoply of new instruments, but Holmes insisted it should remain the same size as its 
predecessor. A team of former NASA engineers now employed at Theranos began assembling a 
model based on large commercially available analyzers. Holmes was no longer pioneering new 
ways of testing blood, but rather miniaturizing existing technology66.  
Nevertheless, the challenges were enormous. The team put together a prototype by 2012 but it 
frequently malfunctioned. At this point, Theranos had already missed several rollout deadlines and 
was on the brink of losing its partnerships67. Running out of time, Holmes stopped developing the 
miniLab and started using traditional laboratory equipment68. Thus, instead of having its 
proprietary devices in stores, Theranos would FedEx patients’ blood samples to its Palo Alto lab 
for analysis. There, it ran most of the tests using conventional machines, such as the Siemens Advia 
1800, which had been modified to be compatible with small blood samples69. To avoid broader 
disclosure of the issue, Holmes allegedly set up a secret subsidiary to purchase the commercial 
analyzers. At the same time, both the board and investors were under the impression that tests were 
being performed on Theranos’ proprietary technology70. When the Wellness Centers opened, only 
15 of the 240 tests offered were run on the Edison and patients were having their blood drawn using 
both the nanotainer collection device and traditional needles71,72. 
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Corporate Governance at Theranos 
Avie Tevanian joined Theranos’ board of directors in 2006 (Exhibit 8). He was Steve Jobs’ former 
right-hand man at Apple and had only recently retired when Holmes invited him to be part of her 
project. Captivated by her passion and entrepreneurial spirit, Tevanian invested $1.5 million in 
Theranos’ preferred stock73. However, after just a few months with the company, he started to get 
frustrated. The revenue projections Holmes presented to the board were increasingly optimistic and 
were based on deals that did not seem to materialize. On top of that, there were consistent delays 
in product rollouts and the CFO had just been fired. When Tevanian queried Holmes about these 
issues and asked to see copies of the licensing contracts, she deflected his questions claiming the 
documents were “held under legal review”74. During a board meeting in late 2007, Holmes 
proposed granting special stock to a non-profit foundation that she created for “tax-planning 
purposes.” Tevanian opposed it as he believed it would provide Holmes with additional voting 
control at the expense of other shareholders. Shortly after the meeting, Tevanian received a call 
from board chairman Donald Lucas who suggested he should resign as Holmes felt he was “asking 
too many questions.” Tevanian agreed75.  
Just months after his departure, Theranos’ general counsel Michael Esquivel presented evidence 
that Holmes had exaggerated revenue projections which were “impossible to reconcile with the 
unfinished state of the product.” This time, the board decided to replace Holmes with a more 
experienced chief executive. However, after confronting her with the verdict, she convinced them 
otherwise by promising to be more transparent going forward. After managing to hold on to her 
seat, Holmes fired Esquivel76.  
When the company faced national expansion five years later, Holmes began an overhaul of the 
board. The first addition was former Secretary of State George Schultz, who was fascinated by 
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Holmes’ “purity of motivation” and by what Theranos’ technology could mean for the healthcare 
industry. Schultz then persuaded other renowned figures of the North American political scene to 
join the board, such as former Secretary of State and Nobel laureate Henry Kissinger. "Elizabeth's 
iron determination and great intellectual ability turned me from a mild skeptic to an enthusiast," 
Kissinger said77. Amidst the board restructure, Holmes pushed for the implementation of a dual-
class share structure. In 2013, the company asked investors to consent to a 5-to-1 forward stock 
split of its Series C1 preferred shares, as it anticipated further capital raises. Class A shareholders 
would get 1 vote per share, while Class B shareholders would get 100. In addition, all of the Class 
A stock held by Holmes would be exchanged for Class B, further solidifying her voting power78. 
Nevertheless, the board kept growing and by 2014 it increased from 5 to12 directors (Exhibit 9). 
According to Fortune magazine, this might have been “the most illustrious board in U.S. corporate 
history”79. Despite receiving stock options in exchange for their positions, the new board members 
all held very limited roles (Exhibit 10)80.  
Media Sensation 
After years of working under a cloak of secrecy, Theranos finally came out of stealth mode. On 
September 7th, 2013 the WSJ published a story touting Theranos’ technology as revolutionary81. 
The timing was not left at chance. Holmes had used her board connections to align the article’s 
publication with the Wellness Centres’ launch in Walgreens stores just two days after82. From then 
on, Holmes started building a brand. She hired the prominent advertising agency Chiat\Day known 
for Apple’s successful “Think Different” campaign. The company was responsible for the website 
and marketing campaigns, which set the focus on how Theranos’ devices only required a drop of 
blood. The “nanotainer” instantly became a synonym of painless medicine (Exhibit 11)83. In 
addition, Holmes hired Oscar-winning filmmaker Errol Morris to direct Theranos’ commercials.  
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Thereafter, the company quickly began gaining traction. Holmes was a charismatic young 
entrepreneur driven by a compelling mission and had over 270 patent applications under her 
name84. Her iconic black turtleneck outfit and decision to drop out of Stanford quickly drew 
comparisons to Steve Jobs as she strived to create her self-proclaimed “iPod of healthcare”85. 
Holmes also encouraged transparency in pricing and publicly promoted FDA monitoring, but how 
her technology worked remained a closely held trade secret86. 
By 2014, money was flowing into Silicon Valley and companies were reaching impressive 
valuations as investors searched for the “next big thing” (Exhibit 12 and 13). Unlike the dotcom 
bubble years before, companies were staying private and accumulating wealth instead of going 
public87. Ahead of a new fundraising round, Holmes pitched Theranos to Partner Management 
Fund (PFM), a San Francisco Hedge Fund with a broad healthcare portfolio. In the marketing 
material provided, Holmes outlined plans to deploy the devices in hospitals, drugstores, doctor’s 
offices as well as on the battlefield88. It also stated that Theranos’ technology had been extensively 
validated by independent auditors89. But this information was misleading. The devices had never 
passed the DoD research phase and pharma companies had only done “limited exploratory work 
through a few pilot projects”90,91. Assuming the deals in the pipeline would generate substantial 
revenues, Balwani sent unaudited financial projections to PFM executives that made a compelling 
case; he forecasted more than $100 million in sales for 2014 and $1 billion in 201592. However, 
these did not match the projections presented internally to Theranos’ board and employees (Exhibit 
14)93. Nevertheless, PFM trusted Holmes as it had a prominent board backing her claims (Exhibit 
15). Thus, in February 2014, PFM invested $96 million at a $9 billion valuation believing the 
company had several catalysts promoting growth94. Holmes owned 50% of the company and 
became the “youngest self-made billionaire in the world.”95 
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Holmes started to feature regularly on magazine covers, TV shows and tech conferences (Exhibit 
16). Her story as a woman thriving in a male-dominated environment inspired and empowered 
young women to pursue careers in science and engineering96. Accolades soon followed. She was 
named Time Magazine’s one of the 100 most influential people in the world, joined Harvard 
Medical School Board of Fellows and was named one of “Five Visionary Tech Entrepreneurs Who 
Are Changing the World” by The New York Times 97. The extensive media coverage brought along 
a new wave of investors as Theranos seemed like a winning bet. This time, several high-profile 
individuals invested, such as billionaire Rupert Murdoch, Carlos Slim, or the Walton family. The 
publicity also enabled Theranos to strike a deal with health insurance company Capital BlueCross, 
allowing it to open new Wellness Centers in Pennsylvania.98 Moreover, the company landed 
“strategic alliances” with academic medical center Cleveland Clinic and healthcare organization 
AmeriHealth Caritas which would make its point-of-care devices widely available to the public99.  
Holmes’ lobbying efforts also helped the state of Arizona to pass a bill in 2015, allowing patients 
to order lab tests without doctors' approval. The law gathered widespread support from legislators, 
who lauded Holmes’ efforts to advance preventative medicine100. Despite the surging number of 
deals, the number of life-sciences VCs and corporate ventures onboard remained low.  
Under Fire 
After a lengthy investigation into the company, John Carreyrou published an article on the cover 
of the WSJ in October 2015. It detailed how Theranos was struggling to turn its technology into 
reality101. For months, Theranos’ attorneys had been trying to stonewall the story by intimidating 
Carreyrou’s confidential sources but were unsuccessful102. The report revealed that Theranos’ 
devices could only perform a fraction of the available tests and the company was using commercial 
analyzers to run most of the tests. It also exposed the fact employees had tampered with quality 
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control checks causing validation results to overstate the device’s accuracy and reliability. 
Consequently, numerous patients received erroneous test results (Exhibit 17)103. The company 
quickly came under heavy fire from the public and found itself targeted in investigations by the 
FDA, CMS and the SEC (Exhibit 18)104. 
Dealing with a PR Crisis and facing criticism over the lack of medical experts on the board, Holmes 
decided to reorganise Theranos’ governance structure. The board of directors was downsized to 5 
members and rearranged into two separate bodies: a governing board and a non-voting board of 
counsellors with advisory responsibilities105. Some of the original members of the board, such as 
Kissinger and Schultz were transferred to the board of counsellors. At the same time, Holmes added 
the company’s legal advisor David Boies to the governing board. Boies was a prominent litigation 
lawyer and was first hired by Theranos to represent the company in a patent dispute case. Since 
Boies regularly took a venture capitalist approach to cases, he was paid in stock rather than regular 
fees106. Furthermore, Holmes created a scientific board which included medical experts responsible 
for helping the company improve its operations and build quality infrastructure107. While this board 
initially consisted of only four members, it expanded to ten just five months later (Exhibit 19)108.  
Unicorn Down 
The board overhaul was not enough to deter critics as the WSJ story had set the company down an 
irreversible path. In January 2016, the CMS warned Theranos its lab posed a safety risk to patients 
after finding infractions related to deficient practices, inaccurate testing and unqualified 
personnel109. A few months later it revoked Theranos’ license to operate labs and banned Holmes 
from the industry for two years110. In an effort to win back investor’s confidence, Theranos added 
two new executives to lead the quality and compliance teams111. However, after growing weary of 
the mounting regulatory troubles and negative publicity, both Safeway and Walgreens terminated 
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their partnerships with Theranos and shut down all of the Wellness Centers112. This decision cost 
the company its primary source of revenue, forcing it to lay off 340 employees113. Deprived of 
direct access to consumers, Holmes finally unveils the miniLab at a medical conference114. The 
device which could allegedly analyze blood samples remotely through cloud computing, signaled 
a shift in the company’s business model115. Yet, scientists remained skeptical.  
On top of all the federal probes and heavy regulatory sanctions, Theranos was drowning in 
litigation116. Indictments and class-action lawsuits kept piling up, forcing the company to commit 
more financial resources to its lawyers than to the development of its technology117. Facing 
imminent cash shortages, Holmes offered to double investors preferred shares in exchange for their 
rights to sue118. Yet, the company continued in desperate need of capital to cover existing 
settlements. As a result, Theranos secured a $100 million collateralized loan from private equity 
firm Fortress Group in December 2017119. In March 2018, the SEC accused Holmes and Balwani 
of “raising more than $700 million from investors through an elaborate, years-long fraud”120. 
Holmes settled but was forced to surrender voting control of the business, barred from being a 
director of a public company and paid a $500,000 fine121. The situation inevitably took a turn for 
the worse when the Department of Justice criminally charged Holmes and Balwani with fraud in 
June 2018122. Left with no other choice, Holmes stepped down as CEO123. In a critical state, the 
company defaulted on the credit facility it had received just one year earlier. Unable to pay both its 
creditors and shareholders, the new CEO, David Taylor, announced a formal dissolution124. The 
once high-flying unicorn had run out of time.  
As of the writing of this case, both Elizabeth Holmes and Ramesh “Sunny” Balwani are scheduled 





Exhibit 1 – Theranos Founding Rounds and Valuation 
 
Disclaimer: Exhibit 1 was compiled using different sources and may contain errors.  
 
Source: Crunchbase. 2019. Crunchbase Inc. 
https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/theranos#section-lists-featuring-this-company 
(accessed September 20, 2019); Carreyrou, John. 2018. “SEC Charges Theranos CEO 
Elizabeth Holmes With Fraud”; SEC Charges Theranos CEO Elizabeth Holmes With Fraud.” 
The Wall Street Journal. March 14. https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-charges-theranos-and-
founder-elizabeth-holmes-with-fraud-1521045648 (accessed December 10, 2019); HBS Law. 
2019. Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP. 
https://www.hbsslaw.com/uploads/case_downloads/theranos/11.28.16_theranos_hagens_berman
_consolidated_complaint.pdf?fbclid=IwAR027XJB7JgNfDWUGYM3QTC-0xwZ-









Date Type Stage Round Deal Terms Funding Valuation
June 2014 Equity Early Stage Seed Conventional Convertible $500k -
December 2004 Equity Early Stage Series A Conventional Convertible $5.8M $23.5M
February 2006 Equity Early Stage Series B Participating Preferred $9.1M $41.4M
November 2006 Equity Expansion Series C Participating Preferred $32.4M $165.4 M
July 2010 Equity Expansion Series C1 Participating Preferred $45M $932M
February 20014 Equity Later Stage Series C2 Participating Preferred $200M $9B
March 2015 Equity Later Stage Series C2 Participating Preferred $432.7M $9B
December 2017 Debt Later Stage - Collateralized Loan $100M -
Disclaimer: the data on this table was collected from different sources and may contain errors
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Disclaimer: Exhibit 2 was compiled using different sources and may contain errors.  
Source: Crunchbase. 2019. Crunchbase Inc. https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/theranos#section-
lists-featuring-this-company (accessed September 20, 2019); Axios. 2019. Axios Media. 
https://www.axios.com/exclusive-theranos-2006-pitch-deck-1513299967-ad008bbd-b684-4e3f-9301-
5d560668d488.html (accessed November 3, 2019); Carreyrou, John, Christopher Weaver and Michael 
Siconolfi. 2016. “Big names take hit on Theranos.” The Wall Street Journal. November 28. 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-names-take-hit-on-theranos-1480379536 (accessed December 17, 2019); 
Leuty, John. 2018. “Ultimately, Elizabeth made the decisions’: A look inside Theranos’ ineffective board.” 
San Francisco Business Times. August 7 
https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/2018/08/07/theranos-elizabeth-holmes-board-kovacevich-
shultz.html (accessed December 16, 2019); HBS Law. 2016. Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP. 
https://www.hbsslaw.com/uploads/case_downloads/theranos/11.28.16_theranos_hagens_berman_consolid
ated_complaint.pdf?fbclid=IwAR027XJB7JgNfDWUGYM3QTC-0xwZ-zLRCF5HPFo5Zwsj-
KLCTxdgjjCzpvc (accessed November 17, 2019) 
Investor Background Amount Round
DJF Ventures Venture Capital Firm (focus on tech) $500K Seed, Series A, B, C
Chang, Esoom Taipei
Multi-billion dollar distribution group; leading distributor of 
high technology devices in Asia
-
Series A
Jupiter Partners Venture Capital and Private Equity Firm (focus on tech) - Series A
Victor Palmiery Real Estate Investor - Series A
Tim Draper Venture Capitalist (focus on tech) $1M Series A
Donal L. Lucas Venture Capital (focus on tech) - Series A
ATA Ventures Early Stage Venture Capital (focus on tech) - Series B and C
Larry Ellison / Tako Ventures Trust Fund / VC firm (focus on biotech) - Series B
Ray Bingham, BJ Cassin, Others Private Equity Firms (focus on tech) - Series B
Doll Capital Management Venture Capital Firm (focus on tech and telecommunications) - Series C
Avie Tevanian Individual Investor / Board Member $1.5M Series C
SandBox
Corporate Venture Fund program (manages investments for 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield insurance plans)
$1.5M Series C1
Blue Venture Fund Corporate Venture Fund program $8.5M Series C1
Richard Kovacevich Board Member $4M -
Walton Family Heirs of Walmart founder $150M Series C2
Rupert Murdoch Executive chairman, 21st Century Fox/News Corp $125M Series C2
Betsy DeVos U.S. Education Secretary in Trump admnistration $100M Series C2
Cox Family Family-controlled conglomerate; Media & Telecomms $100M Series C2
Carlos Slim Media Investor; Mexican Tycoon $30M Series C2
Andreas Dracopoulos Greek shipping magnate $25M Series C2
Oppenheimer family Ex-De beers owners $20M Series C2
Riley Betchel Ex-chairman of the Bechtel Group $6.2M -
Daniel L. Mosley Estate attorney at Cravath, Swaine & Moore $6M Series C2
Robert Kraft New England Patriots owner $1M Series C2
John Elkann Italian industrialist and owner of Fiat Chrysler - Series C2
Robert Colman Retired Investment Banker specialized in technology deals - Series C2
Partner Fund Management Hedge Fund with a large healthcare portfolio $96.1M Series C2
Fortress Investment Group Private-equity firm and subsidiary of SoftBank Group $100M -
Note: "-" means that data is not available
Investments between 2003 and 2013




Exhibit 3  - Theranos “A Presentation for Investors” (June 2006) - Business Highlights 
Source: Adapted from Axios. 2019. Axios Media. https://www.axios.com/exclusive-theranos-2006-pitch-
deck-1513299967-ad008bbd-b684-4e3f-9301-5d560668d488.html (accessed November 3, 2019); 
Carreyrou, John. 2018. Bad Blood: Secrets and Lies in a Silicon Valley Startup. New York. Alfred A. 
Knoph. 
Total estimated revenue: 
$120M - $1.5 billion 
 
Theranos Today (Revenue Projections) 
Existing deals 
• 6 Deals (5 companies): $6-12M for validation phase 
• 6 Phase IV Clinical Trials: $20-$50 million per year                Total estimated revenue: 
• Total estimated revenue: $120-$300 million in 1.5 years 
Deals Under Negotiation                                                                       $120 million - $1.5 billion                                                            
• 15 Deals (10 companies and 1 government agency) 
• $12-52M for validation 
• $300-$750M for phase IVs 
Market Research & Opportunities 
Total Available Market (Phase IV Clinical Trials) 
• Phase IV Clinical Market: $39 billion per year 
• Number of ongoing trials per year: 600 to 800 
• Average Theranos Revenue per trial: $50 million 
• $7,500 “Information Fee” per patient every four months 
• Average: 2,000 to 10,000 patients per trial 
 
Total Available Market (Pharmaceutical Preclinical Market) 
• Pre-clinical Market: $10 billion per year  
o $5 million annual revenue per research group  
o 133 groups per pharmaceutical company 
o 15 companies of this size 
Note: numbers exclude sales to academic institutions (one of largest preclinical segments) 
Drivers for Success 
• First mover advantage 
• Combination of several technology makes reproducing the solution difficult 
• Innovation Pipeline: next generation systems 
• Strong Customer Base, Speed to Market and Focus on quality 
• Patents 








Source: Loria, Kevin. 2015. “Here's exactly what we know about how Theranos' 'revolutionary' 
technology works.” Business Insider. October 17.  https://www.businessinsider.com/how-













Exhibit 5 – The $75B Lab Market: Breakdown of US Medical Lab Testing Market Share (2015) 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Crow, David and Adam Samson. 2015. “Theranos blood labs under fresh 
scrutiny on staffing and quality.” Financial Times. October 24. 
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Exhibit 6 – Valuation Comparison – Quest vs. LabCorp vs. Theranos (FY 2015) 
 
*Estimated by Theranos for FY 2015; real value of revenues was less than $100,000  
 
Bloomberg descriptions 
Quest Diagnostics Inc: the company provides diagnostic testing services in the United States. It 
operates a national network of full-service laboratories, rapid response laboratories, and patient 
service centers. It has 46,000 employees as of 31/12/2018. 
Laboratory Corporation (LabCorp): clinical laboratory company that offers laboratory tests 
used by the medical profession in routine testing, patient diagnosis, and in the monitoring and 
treatment of disease. It generates most of its revenue from the United States, but also operates in 
other countries, such as the U.K., Switzerland and Canada. As of December 2018, the firm 
employed approximately 60,000 people. 
 
Source: Bloomberg; The United States Attorney’s Office. 2019. United States Department of 
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Source: Buhr, Sarah. 2016. “Unpacking the innards of Theranos’s new Zika-detection box.” 
Techcrunch. August 6. https://techcrunch.com/2016/08/05/unpacking-theranoss-magic-zika-














Exhibit 8 – Theranos Board of Directors (2006) 
 
 
Source: Carreyrou, John. 2018. Bad Blood: Secrets and Lies in a Silicon Valley Startup. New 
York. Alfred A. Knoph.; ATA Ventures. 2019. ATA Ventures. http://ataventures.com/team/pete-
thomas/ (accessed December 15, 2019); Donald Lucas. 2019. N.d. Financial Times Conferences. 
http://www.ftconferences.com/userfiles/file/Lucas_Don.pdf (accessed December 15, 2019); 
World Health Organisation. 2019. WHO. 
https://www.who.int/tobacco/global_interaction/tobreg/members/robertson/en/ (accessed 













Theranos founder and CEO
Donald L. Lucas
(Chairman)
Private venture capitalist and early investor in Oracle Corporation. He was Chairman of Oracle (1980 -1990) and served as 
director in several Silicon Valley tech firms, such as DexCom, PDF Solutions, Spansion, Vimicro International.
Pete Thomas
(Director)
Co-founder and Managing Director of ATA Ventures (early investor in Theranos). Over 15 years of experience in venture 
capital, 10+ years of experience in industry companies such as Intel Corporation. Previously served as director of 6 
different companies. Thomas has a BSEE degree from Utah State University and a MS degree in Computer Science from 
the University of Santa Clara.
Avie Tevanian
(Director)
Chief Software Technology Officer at Apple (2003-2006), Vice President of Software Engineering at Apple  (1997-2003). 
Tevanian has a BA in mathematics from the University of Rochester and holds both MS and PhD degrees in computer 
science from Carnegie Mellon University.
Channing Robertson
(Director & Technical Consultant)
Senior Associate Dean and professor of Chemical Engineering at Stanford University. Founding fellow of the American 
Institute of Medical and Biological Engineering. Robertson holds a BS in Chemical Engineering from the University of 
California at Berkeley and both a MS & PhD in Chemical Engineering from Stanford University.
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Exhibit 9 – Theranos Board of Directors (2014) 
 
Note: average board age was 70 years ; without Holmes and Balwani average age is 76 years 
 
Source: Reingold, Jennifer. 2015. “Theranos’ board: Plenty of political connections, little 




Theranos founder, Chairman and CEO
Sunny Balwani
(President, COO & Director)
Former founder, President and CTO at CommerceBid.com (1999–2001). Previously, Sunny worked as software engineer for
Lotus Development Corporation (IBM) and Microsoft. He holds a BA in Information Systems from the University of Texas at 
Austin and an MBA from University of California at Berkeley.
George P. Schultz
(Director)
Former U.S. Secretary of State (1982–1989), U.S. Secretary of Treasury (1972–1974), first director of the Office of
Management and Budget (1970–1972) and U.S. Secretary of Labor (1969–1970). Schultz was also President and director of
the Bechtel Group and a former professor of international economics at Stanford University. He is a fellow at the Hoover
Institution and a recipient of the Presidential Medal of Freedom. Schultz holds a BA in economics from Princeton University
and a PhD in Industrial Economics from MIT.
Gary Roughead
(Director)
Former U.S. Navy Admiral who served as the 29
th
Chief of Naval Operations. Roughed graduated from the U.S. Naval
Academy in 1973 and has since held six operational commands. He is a fellow at the Hoover Institution and the recipient of
several awards, including the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Navy Distinguished Service Medal and Legion of Merit. 
William J. Perry
(Director)
Former U.S. Secretary of Defense (1994–1997), deputy Secretary of Defense (1993–1994) and undersecretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering (1977–1981). Perry is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, a professor at Stanford
University and a recipient of the Presidential Medal of Freedom. He received a BS and MS from Stanford University and a
PhD from Pennsylvania State University, all in mathematics.
Samuel Nunn
(Director)
Former U.S. Senator from Georgia (1972–1996) and chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee (1987–1995). Nunn 
was also on the Intelligence and Small Business Committees. He served as a board member of the Coca-Cola Company and 
General Electric Company and is a fellow at the Hoover Institution. He graduated with honors from Emory Law School. 
James Mattis
(Director)
Former U.S. Marine Corps General who served as Commander of the U.S. Central Command (2010–2013), Commander of
U.S. Joint Forces Command (2007–2010) and as NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation (2007–2009).
Later on, he would also serve as the 26
th
 U.S. Secretary of Defense (2017–2019) in the Trump Administration. Mattis is a
fellow at the Hoover Institution. 
Henry A. Kissinger
(Director)
Former U.S. Secretary of State (1973–1977), U.S. National Security Advisor (1969–1975) and member of the Defense
Policy Board (2001-2016). Kissinger is a fellow at the Hoover Institution, Honor Member of the International Olympic
Committee and served on the board of ContiGroup Companies (1988–2014). He is the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize
(1973), the Presidential Medal of Freedom and of a Bronze Star from the U.S. Army. Kissinger holds a BA in Political
Science from Harvard College and received an MA and PhD degrees from Harvard University. 
William H. Frist, MD
(Director)
Former U.S. Senator from Tennessee (1994–2006) and Senate Majority Leader (2003–2006). Frist was a renowned heart
and lung transplant surgeon and a professor of surgery at Vanderbilt University. He served as chairman of private equity firm
Cressey & Company and held board positions in 3 public companies as well as numerous institutions, including Harvard
Medical School Board of Fellows. Frist graduated from Princeton University and Harvard Medical School.  
William H. Foege, MD
(Director)
Physician and epidemiologist. Foege served as the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (1977–1983)
as well as Executive Director of The Carter Center (1986–1992). He is also a former professor of International Health at




Chairman (1990–2017) and former CEO (1990–1996) of Bechtel Group. He is a director of Fremont Investors and a
member of Fremont Group’s Board of Advisors. He received a combined JD and MBA degree from Stanford University’s
School of Law and Graduate School of Business. Bechtel also has a bachelor's degree in political science and psychology
from the University of California at Davis. 
Richard Kovacevich
(Director)
Former Chairman (2001–2009), President (1998–2005) and CEO (1998–2007) of Wells Fargo. Kovacevich previously
served on the boards of directors of Cisco Systems, Target, PetSmart, Northern States Power Company and ReliaStar
Financial Corporation. He holds a BS and MS in Industrial Engineering as well as an MBA from Stanford University. 
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leadership/ (accessed November 30, 2019); Feuerstein Adam, Damian Garde and Rebecca 
Robbins. “Investigators say his fingerprints are all over financial crime at Theranos. Why is he a 
virtual ghost?”. Stat News. March 19. https://www.statnews.com/2018/03/19/theranos-ramesh-
balwani/ (accessed November 2, 2019); Hoover Institution. 2019. Board of Trustees of Leland 
Stanford Junior University. https://www.hoover.org/fellows (accessed December 11, 2019); Bill 
Frist. 2019. Bill Frist. http://billfrist.com/extended-biography/ (accessed December 11, 2019); 
Henry A. Kissinger. 2019. Henry A. Kissinger. https://www.henryakissinger.com/ (accessed 
December 12, 2019); Emory University. 2019. Emory University. http://www.ph-
leader.emory.edu/people/bio-section-faculty/foege-william.html (accessed December 14, 2019); 
Betchel. 2019. Bechtel Corporation. https://www.bechtel.com/about-us/leadership/riley-bechtel/ 
(accessed December 16, 2019); Hudson Executive Capital. 2019. Hudson Executive Capital. 




















Exhibit 10 – Partially redacted article by The WSJ about Theranos’ board response to the Crisis 
(May 30, 2017) 
Court Documents Shed Light on Theranos Board’s Response to Crisis 
Two former Theranos Inc. directors said they didn’t follow up on public allegations that the Silicon Valley 
blood-testing firm was relying on standard technology rather than its much-hyped proprietary device for most 
tests, according to newly released court documents.  (…) 
In depositions, the highly decorated former directors—former U.S. Navy Adm. Gary Roughead and former U.S. 
Secretary of State George Shultz —who were board members when concerns of employees and regulators 
became public—said they didn’t question Theranos founder Elizabeth Holmes about the matter. Both former 
directors said (…) that they thought Theranos could do all its patient tests on its proprietary device. Regulators 
said last year that Theranos only did a dozen types of patient tests on its own system. 
“I don’t have the information that would tell me that it’s true or not true,” Mr. Roughead testified on March 24, 
referring to reports that Theranos relied on standard devices. Asked whether he ever asked Ms. Holmes about 
the matter, Mr. Roughead said: “I did not ask her directly, no.” Asked whether he questioned anyone else at the 
company, Mr. Roughead said: “I did not.” 
Mr. Shultz separately testified that he “didn’t probe into” whether the firm’s technology was working, adding: 
“It didn’t occur to me.” He added: “Since I didn’t know, I didn’t have anything to look into.”  (…) 
Federal regulators have cited problems with tests Theranos performed on its own devices as well as commercial 
lab equipment, leading the company to retract nearly one million patient blood-test results over the past year.  
(…) Ms. Holmes controls 98.3% of Theranos’ voting shares and under company rules, the board can’t make 
decisions unless she is present, the records showed.  (…) 
George Shultz said in his deposition he believed Theranos could run the tests it offered on its own system partly 
because he had witnessed the device in action. “I also could observe that sometimes it took longer than other 
times for the machine to do whatever it did,” he said of the demonstrations he saw. “And that was because the 
things you asked it to do were more complicated than others, but it seemed to do them.”  
A (….) lawyer asked Adm. Roughead whether he believed Theranos was accurately performing its tests. “That 
was my understanding,” he said, adding that he continued to believe that “based on information that was 
provided to me.” 
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Source: Weaver, Christopher. 2017. “Court Documents Shed Light on Theranos Board’s 
Response to Crisis.” The Wall Street Journal. May 30. https://www.wsj.com/articles/court-
documents-shed-light-on-theranos-boards-response-to-crisis-
1496136600?mod=searchresults&page=3&pos=20 (accessed December 12, 2019) 
 
 




Source: HBS Law. 2016. Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP. 
https://www.hbsslaw.com/uploads/case_downloads/theranos/11.28.16_theranos_hagens_berman
_consolidated_complaint.pdf?fbclid=IwAR027XJB7JgNfDWUGYM3QTC-0xwZ-











Source: US MoneyTree Reporting. 2019. PWC. 
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Exhibit 13 – Most Valuable Startups in the World, “Billion Dollar Club” (February 2014) 
 
 
Source: Allison, Scott, Chris Canipe and Sarah Slobin. 2015. "The Billion Dollar Startup Club." 
The Wall Street Journal. February 15. https://www.wsj.com/graphics/billion-dollar-
club/?fbclid=IwAR1g4GYCTwphK6iHrDYv7IQhx1fBKwlzseUfaXS7d_BBcgm82weKk-


















Main sources of revenue: pharmaceutical services ($40M), lab services for hospitals ($9M), lab 
services for doctors’ offices ($9M) 
Real revenues generated in 2014: $100,000 
 
 
Source: Carreyrou, John. 2018. Bad Blood: Secrets and Lies in a Silicon Valley Startup. New 
York. Alfred A. Knoph.; Robinson, Matt and Rebecca Spalding. 2018. “Blood, Fraud and 
Money Led to Theranos CEO's Fall from Grace.” Bloomberg. March 14. 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-14/theranos-ceo-holmes-accused-of-fraud-
by-sec-jeraxw6a?sref=HkUZcIkG (accessed October 20, 2019); Carreyrou, John. 2018. “SEC 
Charges Theranos CEO Elizabeth Holmes With Fraud”. The Wall Street Journal. March 14. 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-charges-theranos-and-founder-elizabeth-holmes-with-fraud-











2014 $261 M $165 M
2015 $1,680 M $1,080 M
2014 $50 M $35 M






Exhibit 15 -  Example of board support: Henry Kissinger Profile on Elizabeth Holmes, Time 
Magazine (April 2015)  
 
Source: Scott, Matthew. 2015. “Elizabeth Holmes.” Times. April 2015. 







Exhibit 16 -  Timeline of Theranos Media Coverage (2013 – 2015) 
Date Description 
September 7, 2013 
The Wall Street Journal publishes a story titled “Elizabeth Holmes: The Breakthrough 
of Instant Diagnosis”, describing the company’s technology for the first time 
September 9, 2013 
Walgreens and Theranos publicly announce their partnership, opening the first 
Wellness Centers in Phoenix, Arizona 
February 18, 2014 
Wired magazine publishes an interview with Elizabeth Holmes. She lists her fear of 
needles and desire to change the healthcare system as reasons for starting the 
company 
June 12, 2014 
Holmes makes the cover of Fortune magazine with the headline “This CEO is out for 
blood”. 
July 8, 2014 
USA Today runs a rousing profile story on Elizabeth Holmes and Theranos 
technology 
August 29, 2014 Holmes features in Fortunes' "40 Under 40" list 
September 8, 2014 
Holmes performs a live demonstration of the blood testing technology on stage at 
TechCrunch Disrupt 
September 10, 2014 
Holmes speaks at TEDMED about how her technology can help individuals 
anticipate and prevent diseases 
September 29, 2014 
Holmes is included in Forbes' 400 wealthiest list. Her net worth is estimated to be 
$4.5 billion 
October 8, 2014 Holmes takes the stage at Fortune's Most Powerful Women Summit 
December 3, 2014 Holmes is interviewed on stage at Fortune's MPW Next Gen Summit 
December 4, 2014 
Holmes is the youngest recipient of the prestigious Horatio Alger Award. It honors 
the achievements of outstanding Americans who have succeeded in spite of adversity. 
December 8, 2014 The New Yorker releases a profile on Elizabeth Holmes 
March 17, 2015 
The World Economic Forum names Elizabeth Holmes as part of the 2015 class of 
Young Global Leaders 
April 16, 2015 
CBS This Morning interviews Holmes with the headline “The world's youngest self-
made female billionaire”; Holmes is named as one of Time magazine's 100 Most 
Influential People 
May 11, 2015 
President Obama names Elizabeth Holmes as Presidential Ambassador for Global 
Entrepreneurship 
May 28, 2015 Elizabeth Holmes joins Harvard Medical School's Board of Fellows 
June 3, 2015 
Holmes is interviewed on a segment of "Charlie Rose", a TV show known for 
interviewing noteworthy people in fields such as business, politics, sports or science 
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Exhibit 16 (continued) -  Timeline of Theranos Media Coverage (2013 – 2015) 
Date Description 
July 23, 2015 
U.S. Vice President Joe Biden visits Theranos' lab facility. Biden praises the company 
as inspirational and a driving force in the medical industry. He states that both him 
and President Obama share Holmes' vision 
September 29, 2015 Holmes is ranked #121 in Forbes 400  with an estimated net worth of $4.5 billion 
September 30, 2015 
Holmes is interviewed by Bill Clinton on the Clinton Global Initiative event, 
alongside Jack Ma and Chelsea Clinton 
October, 2015 Holmes is featured on the cover of Inc. under the title “The Next Steve Jobs” 
October 5, 2015 
Holmes receives the Under 30 Doers Award at Forbes' Under 30 Summit in 
Philadelphia 
October 12, 2015 
The New York Times names Elizabeth Holmes as one of the "Five Visionary Tech 
Entrepreneurs Who Are Changing the World" 
October 14, 2015 Senator John McCain visits Theranos' lab and labels its technology as innovative 
 
Source: A Theranos Timeline. 2019. The New York Times. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/09/business/theranos-elizabeth-holmes-timeline.html 
(accessed December 17, 2019); Keshavan, Meghana and Neil Versel. 2016. “Theranos 
Doomsday Clock: A full timeline of its rise and fall.” MedCity News. February 5. 
https://medcitynews.com/2016/02/theranos-doomsday-clock-full-timeline-rise-fall/ (accessed 
December 17, 2019); Kulwin, Noah. 2015. “Theranos CEO Elizabeth Holmes's Five Best Cover 
Story Appearances, Ranked.” Recode. October 26. 
https://www.vox.com/2015/10/26/11620036/theranos-ceo-elizabeth-holmess-five-best-cover-
story-appearances (accessed December 17, 2019); Shivakumar, Felicia. 2014. “Jon Shieber gets 
some blood work done with Elizabeth Holmes of Theranos.” TechCrunch.  
https://techcrunch.com/video/jon-shieber-gets-some-blood-work-done-with-elizabeth-holmes-of-
theranos-2/ (accessed December 17, 2019); Kelly, Heather and Jackie Wattles. 2018. “The rise 
and fall of Elizabeth Holmes.” CNN Business. March 
15.https://money.cnn.com/2018/03/14/technology/theranos-elizabeth-holmes-timeline/index.html 
(accessed December 17, 2019); Fortune Live Media. 2019. Fortune. 
https://fortuneconferences.com/most-powerful-women-summit-2014/2014-agenda/#day-3 
(accessed December 19, 2019); Twitter. 2019. Twitter, Inc. 
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https://twitter.com/senjohnmccain/status/654714209360437249?lang=en (accessed December 17, 
2019); Parr, Rebecca. 2015. “Vice President Joe Biden visits biotech firm Theranos’ Newark 
production facility.” The Mercury News. August 12. 
https://www.mercurynews.com/2015/07/23/vice-president-joe-biden-visits-biotech-firm-
theranoss-newark-production-facility/ (accessed December 16, 2019); Della Cava, Marco. 2014. 
“Change Agents: Elizabeth Holmes wants your blood.” USA Today. July 8.  
https://eu.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/07/08/change-agents-elizabeth-holmes-theranos-blood-
testing-revolution/12183437/ (accessed October 30, 2019); Hedgecock, Sarah. 2015. “Elizabeth 
Holmes on using business to change the world.” Forbes. October 5. 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahhedgecock/2015/10/05/elizabeth-holmes-on-using-business-
to-change-the-world/ (accessed December 16, 2019); The Benefactor. 2015. Harvard Medical 
School. https://hms.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Benefactor_Fall%202015.pdf (accessed 
December 16, 2019); Tau, Byron. 2015. “Meet President Obama’s Entrepreneurship 
Ambassadors.” The Wall Street Journal. May 11. 
https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/05/11/meet-president-obamas-entrepreneurship-




















Source: Carreyrou, John. 2015. “Hot startup Theranos has struggled with its blood-test 
technology.” The Wall Street Journal. October 16. https://www.wsj.com/articles/theranos-has-











Exhibit 18 -  Timeline of Theranos Downfall (2015 – 2018) 
Date Description 
July 2, 2015 
Theranos receives its first and only clearance from the FDA (agency responsible for 
regulating medical devices). The finger prick technology is cleared to be used in 
herpes virus tests 
October 15, 2015 
WSJ publishes a front-cover story questioning the accuracy of Theranos blood tests 
and detailing flaws in its proprietary technology 
October 27, 2015 
Theranos suspends the use of the “nanotainer” after the FDA publicly reported it as 
an “uncleared medical device” and cited the company for unsuitable quality and 
safety controls in its laboratories 
October 28, 2015 
Theranos announces the creation of a new Governing Board, a Board of Counselors 
and a Scientific and Medical Advisory Board 
November 10, 2015 
Safeway deal falls through after Theranos repeatedly missed roll out deadlines and 
executives questioned the validity of Theranos’ test results 
January 27, 2016 
CMS (responsible for overseeing lab testing) states that it has found five major 
infractions in Theranos’ lab which pose "immediate jeopardy to patient health and 
safety". The agency gave Theranos 10 days to correct the issues 
March 28, 2016 
A peer-review study published in the Journal of Clinical Investigation found that 
Theranos tests were considerably less accurate and reliable than its competitors 
March 31, 2016 
CMS releases a 121-page report on Theranos’ lab in Newark citing the use of 
unqualified personnel, failure to ensure quality-control checks, inappropriate storage 
of samples and poor blood-testing accuracy 
April 18, 2016 SEC starts investigating the company 
May 11, 2016 
Balwani leaves the company amid regulatory probes. His departure follows Theranos' 
announcement of a broader board reorganization 
May 18, 2016 
Theranos voids all blood test results run on the Edison (2014-2015) and issues 
thousands of corrected reports to doctors and patients 
June 1, 2016 
Forbes revises Theranos valuation down to $800 million and lowers Holmes' net 
worth estimate to $0 
June 12, 2016 Walgreens terminates its partnership with Theranos. 
July 7, 2016 
CMS revokes Theranos' CLIA license to operate labs and bans Holmes from the 
blood-testing industry for two years. 
July 21, 2016 Theranos names two new compliance executives 
August 1, 2016 
Holmes officially announces the miniLab at the American Association for Clinical 
Chemistry (AACC) annual meeting. The new version of the device would be used 
outside centralized clinical labs, such as in intensive-care units. Attendees were 




Exhibit 18 (continued)  -  Timeline of Theranos Downfall (2015 – 2018) 
October 5, 2016 
Theranos announces it will close its blood-testing facilities (clinical labs and 
Wellness Centers) cut its workforce by more than 40% (340 employees) 
October 10, 2016 
Partner Management Fund sues Theranos for “fraudulently inducing” the investment 
through “a series of lies". The VC firm who had invested $96.1 million, settled 7 
months later for $43 million 
November 8, 2016 
Walgreens files a $140 million lawsuit against Theranos for breach of contract. The 
case is settled 9 months later for an estimated $30 million 
January 6, 2017 
Theranos lays off an additional 155 employees, which represents close to 41% of the 
remaining staff 
April 18, 2017 
Theranos settles with the CMS for $30,000 and pays $4.65 million to the state of 
Arizona reimbursement fund 
May 1, 2017 
Theranos settles lawsuit with PFM for $43 million; the lawsuit was restricting 
Theranos ability to proceed with a tender offer of preferred shares to investors who 
agreed not to sue. Theranos made an ultimatum to PFM and threatened to file for 
bankruptcy protection if the fund did not agree to swap additional preferred shares 
for its rights to sue 
December 23, 2017 
Theranos secures $100 million in debt financing from Fortress Investment Group. 
The loan was collateralized by patents, granted Fortress warrants for the company’s 
equity and required Theranos to produce audited financial statements 
March 14, 2018 
SEC presses civil charges against Holmes and Balwani for fraud in which they 
"exaggerated or made false statements about the company’s technology, business, 
and financial performance". Holmes later settled and agreed to pay a $500,000 
penalty without admitting wrongdoing. She forfeited voting control of the company, 
returned 18.9 million shares to shareholders (converted Class B to Class A shares) 
and was barred from serving as an officer/director of a public company for 10 years 
April 10, 2018 
Theranos lays off most of its remaining workforce (125 people) in an effort to avoid 
bankruptcy 
June 15, 2018 
The U.S. Department of Justice files criminal charges against Holmes and Balwani, 
accusing them of two counts of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and nine counts of 
wire fraud. Holmes steps down as CEO but remains as chairman of the board. The 
company's general counsel, David Taylor, was appointed as her replacement 
September, 2018 
Theranos tried to secure a bid to sell the company after 80 potential buyers reached 
out, 17 of which executed NDAs. Despite Theranos assistance with due diligence and 
numerous follow-on conversations, none of the leads materialized in a transaction 
September 5, 2018 
The company defaults on the Fortress loan following a covenant breach and formally 
dissolves. Theranos tries to negotiate a settlement in which Fortress would take 
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Exhibit 19 – Scientific and Medical Advisory Board (April 2016) 
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